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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of the United States has not provided
specific answers to many of the questions that arise concerning
the role and rights of the individual in labor arbitration.
Although many of these questions have been the subject of
t Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, 1988-89, William Mitchell College
of Law. A.B., Brown University; J.D., Harvard University.
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spirited discussions by arbitrators, and some of the various
views on these questions have been set forth in the published
literature,' Gerald Aksen, former General Counsel of the
American Arbitration Association, has properly said that "arbi-
tration and individual rights cannot be overexplored." 2 Thus,
this article will attempt to shed some new light on this subject,
particularly as the questions concerning the role and rights of
the individual in labor arbitration may call for a ruling or other
action by an arbitrator. In connection with such questions this
article will examine a series of claims that have been made on
behalf of individuals. Relevant judicial rulings and positions
which labor arbitrators are likely to take in actual practice
when such questions arise will be identified, and observations
on the propriety of such positions will be made.
A. Rights Arbitration v. Interest Arbitration
Questions involving the role and rights of the individual in
labor arbitration are far more likely to arise in connection with
"rights" arbitration than in connection with "interest" arbitra-
tion. In rights arbitration a grievant is claiming a violation of
rights under an applicable collective bargaining agreement. A
grievance has been filed under the grievance procedure provi-
sions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, and it
1. See McKelvey, The Duty of Fair Representation: Has the Arbitrator a Responsibility?,
41 ARB. J. 51 (June 1986). The author presents a brief review of various views of
members of the National Academy of Arbitrators on the nature of an arbitrator's
responsibilities to assure due process to individual grievants involved in arbitration
procedures. The author begins with the views of W. Willard Wirtz as set forth in
1958 at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators. Mr.
Wirtz believed that if the arbitrator failed to protect the individual's rights in an arbi-
tration hearing, the courts would do so. See also Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS
1-36 [U. McKelvey ed. 1958).
2. Aksen, Introduction, THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA, at ix
(1976). Accord Rabin, The Duty of Fair Representation in Arbitration, THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION, 84-96 J. McKelvey ed. 1977); Rabin, Fair Representation in Arbitra-
tion, THE CHANGING LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 173-207 (J. McKelvey ed. 1985).
Additional valuable studies published in this 1985 book are one by Professor James
T. Jones. See Jones, Time for a Mid-Course Correction, THE CHANGING LAw OF FAIR REP-
RESENTATION 269-71 U1. McKelvey ed. 1985), and another by Judge (former arbitra-
tor) Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Court of Appeals, in Edwards, The Duty of Fair
Representation: A View from the Bench, THE CHANGING LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
93-95 (1. McKelvey ed. 1985). Still another article relevant to this topic is Levin, The
Duty of Fair Representation: The Role of the Arbitrator, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 309-19 U. Stern & B.
Dennis eds. 1981).
[Vol. 15
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has been processed in accordance with the terms of this proce-
dure to the final step-which normally is arbitration. Although
no federal law requires that collective bargaining agreements
in the private sector of the American economy provide for ar-
bitration as the terminal point of a grievance procedure,
3
about ninety-five percent of the collective bargaining agree-
ments in the United States do in fact provide for "rights"
arbitration.
4
On the other hand, "interest" arbitration, which is used
much less frequently than rights arbitration, involves mutual
agreement of an employer and a union to arbitrate the ques-
tion of what shall be the terms of a new collective bargaining
agreement or what revisions shall be made in the terms of an
expiring or expired collective bargaining agreement. 5 In inter-
est arbitration the issues are more likely to involve such broad
questions as general increases in pay in the overall wage struc-
ture, installation of a new job classification program, an in-
crease or decrease in the number of paid holidays and broad
concession matters in times of economic stress, etc.
In contrast, the most common types of grievances which are
arbitrated in rights arbitration involve questions of whether
employees have been discharged for just cause, whether an
employer had just cause to impose disciplinary suspensions on
3. The adjudication of labor grievances in other countries differs from the way
such grievances are handled in the United States:
In many other industrial relations systems, adjudication of grievances has
not been left in the hands of private arbitral tribunals.
In Canada, where institutional arrangements most closely resemble
those of the United States, labor relations statutes typically provide that: (a)
the parties must write no-strike and arbitration clauses into collective bar-
gaining agreements, (b) in the event of their failure to do so, standard form
clauses are deemed to be included, and (c) arbitrators enjoy certain proce-
dural powers, including the right to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses,
and enforce awards by registering them in the court. See, e.g., Ontario Labor
Relations Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. 1960, c.202, as amended, Sections 33, 34.
However, the operation of the system otherwise closely conforms to the
United States model.
In a number of European countries, labor courts perform some func-
tions analogous to our arbitration boards (as well as many other functions).
For example, in France, the labor courts (conseils de prud' hommes) have juris-
diction only over disputes relating to individual employment contracts, in
Germany over both individual and collective agreement disputes, and in
Sweden over collective agreement disputes only.
J. ATLESON, R. RABIN, G. SCHATZKI, H. SHERMAN & E. SILVERSTEIN, LABOR RELATION
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 464 (2d ed. 1984).
4. Id. at 459.
5. Id. at 462.
1989]
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employees, whether the seniority provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement have been properly applied to an em-
ployee who has grieved and whether the wage provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement have been properly applied to
a grievant who has filed a grievance. 6 Thus, it is not surprising
that questions involving the role and rights of an individual
employee are more likely to arise in connection with rights ar-
bitration since individuals are more likely to identify more per-
sonally with the types of issues which are arbitrated in that kind
of arbitration.
B. Claim that Individual Should Have a Vested Right to Have a
Grievance Arbitrated
Some commentators have claimed that individual employees
should have a vested right to use the grievance and arbitration
provisions of an applicable collective bargaining agreement,
7
particularly where critical job interests (such as protection
from discharge or improper layoff) are involved.8 Since this is
one question concerning the rights of individuals in arbitration
that has been answered by the Supreme Court of the United
States, the answer to this question should be set forth early in
this article. Although it is not an issue which is likely to require
a ruling by an arbitrator, the rulings of the Supreme Court on
this issue provide important background thinking which affects
the views set forth below.
In Vaca v. Sipes9 an employee was discharged for poor health
after he returned from a sick leave. To obtain reinstatement, a
grievance was filed, and it was processed through the first four
steps of the grievance procedure. Medical evidence concern-
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining Agreements and Arbi-
tration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 361 (1962).
8. Professor Blumrosen has argued that an individual employee should be per-
mitted to compel his bargaining representative (the union) to process meritorious
grievances involving only the critical job interests of discharge, compensation and
seniority. Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Author-
ity Versus Employment Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 631 (1959). This and other views
(including the view that the individual should have a general vested right to use the
grievance and arbitration provisions of an applicable collective bargaining agree-
ment) are set forth in Aaron, The Individual's Legal Rights as an Employee, 86 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 666, 671-72 (1963). For other relevant articles of that period of time see
Aaron, SomeAspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OHio ST. L.J. 39 (1961);
and Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956).
9. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
[Vol. 15
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ing grievant's fitness to work was in conflict. At union ex-
pense, the union had the grievant go to a medical doctor to
support its position in the event the union took the case to
arbitration, but the medical examination did not support the
grievant's claim. Thus, the union did not process the griev-
ance to arbitration. In response, the grievant sued the union
in a Missouri state court, alleging that the union had "arbitrar-
ily, capriciously and without justifiable reason or cause" re-
fused to take the grievance to arbitration under the grievance
procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. In
this action against the union the jury found that the grievant
was entitled to $7,000 compensatory damages and $3,300 in
punitive damages. Although the trial court set the verdict
aside on jurisdictional grounds, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri reversed and reinstated the verdict.' 0
An appeal of this well-known case to the Supreme Court of
the United States led to a series of important rulings related to
the duty of fair representation which a union representing a
majority of employees in a bargaining unit owes to members of
that unit. Recognizing that "courts will be compelled to pass
upon whether there has been a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation in the context of many § 301 breach-of-contract ac-
tions,"" the Court stated that "[a] breach of the statutory duty
of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct to-
ward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith."' 12
Of particular relevance to the issue of the rights of the indi-
10. Id. at 174.
11. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 187. The Court is referring to section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Sec-
tion 301(a) of this Act reads as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this Chapter, or between any such labor organization, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citi-
zenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
12. Id. at 190. The union's duty of fair representation was first recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the Court made it clear that the duty of fair
representation is applicable to administration of the collective bargaining agreement
as well as to negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. 355 U.S. at 46.
1989]
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vidual in arbitration are the following passages from the
Court's opinion:
Some have suggested that every individual employee should
have the right to have his grievance taken to arbitration....
[W]e do not agree that the individual employee has an
absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration re-
gardless of the provisions of the applicable collective bar-
gaining agreement .... In providing for a grievance and
arbitration procedure which gives the union discretion to
supervise the grievance machinery and to invoke arbitra-
tion, the employer and the union contemplate that each will
endeavor in good faith to settle grievances short of arbitra-
tion [and that] frivolous grievances are ended prior to the
most costly and time-consuming step in the grievance
procedures ...
If the individual employee could compel arbitration of his
grievance regardless of its merit, the settlement machinery
provided by the contract would be substantially
undermined....
Having concluded that the individual employee has no
absolute right to have his grievance arbitrated under the
collective bargaining agreement at issue, and that a breach
of the duty of fair representation is not established merely
by proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious, we
must conclude that that duty was not breached here.' 3
Although the majority opinion in this case recognizes in
dicta that "an order compelling arbitration should be viewed
as one of the available remedies when a breach of the union's
duty is proved,"' 4 Justice Black in his dissent points to the hur-
dles which the individual must overcome to obtain relief:
The rule is that before an employee can sue his employer
under § 301 of the L.M.R.A. for a simple breach of his em-
ployment contract, the employee must prove not only that
he attempted to exhaust his contractual remedies, but that
his attempt to exhaust them was frustrated by "arbitrary,
discriminatory or ... bad faith" conduct on the part of his
union....
It puts an intolerable burden on employees with meritori-
13. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190-95. The Supreme Court thus rejects the New Jersey
view set forth in Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963) that
an individual has an absolute right to process a discharge grievance through all steps
of the grievance procedure to arbitration, and that the individual has the right to
control the presentation of his case.
14. Id. at 196.
[Vol. 15
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ous grievances and means they frequently will be left with
no remedy. 15
While Vaca v. Sipes, decided 1967, dealt with the rights of the
individual in the context of a lawsuit under section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, it was not until 197516 that the Supreme
Court of the United States interpreted the provisos of section
9(a) of the amended National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1
7
A reading of the provisos, particularly the first proviso, to sec-
tion 9(a) of the amended NLRA could lead one to believe that
the individual has a legal right to process his grievance in the
grievance procedure of an applicable collective bargaining
agreement, since this statutory provision clearly states that em-
ployees have the "right at any time to present grievances to
their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative . . .8 Of
course, this provision should be considered in the context of a
complete statement of section 9(a), which reads as follows:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of em-
ployment: Provided, that any individual employee or a group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining repre-
sentative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect: Provided further, that the bargaining represen-
tative has been given opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.19
Although the words of the first proviso "that any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
15. Id. at 203-10 (Black, J, dissenting).
16. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50,
61 (1975).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
18. Id.
19. Id. The first part of section 9(a) gives the majority union the status of an
exclusive bargaining representative for all employees in the bargaining unit regard-
less of whether they are members of the union. This feature of the American indus-
trial relations system distinguishes the U.S. system from the industrial relations
systems of Western Europe.
1989]
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time to present grievances to their employer" 20 were con-
tained in the original NLRA of 193521 (popularly known as the
Wagner Act), the Supreme Court of the United States never
resolved the dispute over the various interpretations of this
language which arose between 1935 and 1947. In 1947 the
balance of the current language in section 9(a) was added to
the NLRA by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
(Taft-Hartley Act), 22 and finally in 1975 in Emporium Capwell v.
Western Addition Community Org.23 the Supreme Court of the
United States considered the meaning of the current language
in the first proviso to section 9(a).
In Emporium Capwell some individual black employees at a
store, who ignored their union (which was trying to help them
with their grievances) and who picketed the store in protest
against the company's allegedly racist employment practices,
were discharged. Holding that the NLRA did not protect
those employees against discharge because their activities
should have been channelled through the grievance procedure
and handled by the union, the Court relied on the exclusive
representation concept set forth in the opening part of section
9(a) of the NLRA. 24 The Court agreed with the National Labor
Relations Board that these minority employees could not cir-
cumvent the union, their elected representative, to engage in
20. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
21. Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 stat. § 449 et seq. (1935).
22. Labor management Relations Act, 1947, (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, § 9, 61
stat. 136 (1947). For an analysis of the impact of the 1947 amendments on the pre-
1947 cases, see Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 35 (1949).
23. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 61-73.
24. The Court also indicates that employees who elect collective bargaining must
take the "bitter with the better" and that not all individual employees are necessarily
better off under collective bargaining. The Court set forth this philosophy in the
following language: "Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining, where
the employees elect that course, is the principle of majority rule. In establishing a
regime of majority rule Congress sought to secure to all members of the unit the
benefits of their collective strength and bargaining power, in full awareness that the
superior strength of some individuals or groups might be subordinated to the inter-
est of the majority .... As a result, '[t]he complete satisfaction of all who are repre-
sented is hardly to be expected.' Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338
(1953)." Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62 (citations omitted).
Obviously, Emporium Capwell shows that selection of a union as bargaining repre-
sentative by employees reduces the opportunities for individual employees to deal
directly with the employer.
[Vol. 15
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bargaining with their employer over issues of employment
discrimination.
The meaning of the proviso to section 9(a) was not a princi-
pal issue in Emporium Capwell, but in a footnote 25 the Court said
the local civil rights organization representing the picketers
"misapprehends the nature of the 'right' conferred by [the
proviso]" and that:
The intendment of the proviso is to permit employees to
present grievances and to authorize the employer to enter-
tain them without opening itself to liability for dealing di-
rectly with employees in derogation of the duty to bargain
only with the exclusive bargaining representative, a viola-
tion of § 8(a)(5). The Act nowhere protects this "right" by
making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
to entertain such a presentation, nor can it be read to au-
thorize resort to economic coercion. This matter is fully ex-
plicated in Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists.
26
Thus, the Supreme Court followed the reasoning of Black-
Clawson27 where the Second Circuit, in a declaratory judgment
action under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, said that sec-
tion 9(a)
does not confer upon an individual grievant the power, en-
forceable in a court of law, to compel the employer to arbi-
trate his [discharge] grievance .... Despite Congress' use
of the word "rights" . . . we are convinced that the proviso
was designed merely to confer upon the employee the privi-
lege to approach his employer .... The proviso was appar-
ently designed to safeguard . . . the employer who
voluntarily processed employee grievances .... The office
of a proviso is seldom to create substantive rights and obli-
gations; it carves exceptions out of what goes before."
28
Therefore, it is clear that an individual employee does not
have a vested right to appeal his grievance to arbitration or to
have his grievance taken to arbitration where the collective
bargaining agreement does not provide any such right. 29 An
25. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 61 n.12.
26. Id. (citations omitted).
27. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d
Cir. 1962).
28. Id. at 184-85.
29. A collateral question, though not involving an issue of a ruling by an arbitra-
tor, is whether an individual employee may obtain relief in a state court action under
state law for alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement. In such an action
1989l
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elaboration of this view and some of the underlying policy rea-
sons in support of this view are set forth in the following ex-
cerpt from an opinion of Betty Murphy, former Chairman of
the National Labor Relations Board:
Thus, an employee who feels aggrieved by some action of
the employer can file a grievance under the contract but has
no standing to compel the union to process the grievance
through arbitration if the grievance is resolved against the
employee. Arbitration is a costly process and unions for the
most part lack the resources necessary to [arbitrate] every
grievance filed. Indeed, short of a failure to fairly repre-
sent, unions have wide discretion in determining which
grievances to pursue to arbitration and which to abandon or
to trade off in favor of some other advantage.
30
It is against this backdrop that the present article will turn to
a series of specific claims involving the role and rights of an
individual employee in labor arbitration which may call for a
ruling or other action by an arbitrator.
II. CLAIM THAT A NON-GRIEVANT EMPLOYEE WHO WILL BE
AFFECTED BY THE ARBITRATION AWARD HAS A RIGHT
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ARBITRATION
HEARING
A common type of grievance which is appealed to arbitration
is a grievance by a senior employee who is claiming that he
should have been promoted to fill a vacancy in a higher-paying
job rather than the junior employee (with less seniority) who
was promoted by the employer on the ground that the junior
employee has greater ability than the senior employee to per-
form the duties of the higher-paying job. Most unions in the
United States are strong believers in the role of seniority, and
most collective bargaining agreements contain seniority provi-
the plaintiff may be defeated by precedents illustrated by Newspaper Guild of
Greater Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Daily News, 401 Pa. 337, 164 A.2d 215 (1960),
where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that
in Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026, [400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960)] ...
we held that a union member-employee cannot individually enforce senior-
ity rights governed by a grievance procedure in a collective bargaining
agreement even though the provisions relied upon inure directly for the
benefit of the employee and make him in effect a third party beneficiary of
the agreement.
Newspaper Guild, 401 Pa. at 344, 164 A.2d at 219.
30. General American Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 813 (1977) (Murphy,
Chairman, concurring)
[Vol. 15
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss2/4
LABOR ARBITRATION
sions. If the collective bargaining agreement contains a senior-
ity provision applicable to promotions to higher-paying jobs,
the union normally supports the grievance of the senior em-
ployee who is seeking the promotion.
If the grievance is not settled in the grievance procedure and
is appealed by the union, on behalf of the senior employee, to
arbitration, does the junior employee who has been promoted
by the employer and who will be displaced if the union wins in
arbitration have a right to notice of the arbitration hearing and
a right to participate in the hearing?31 Professor Clyde Sum-
mers, a respected scholar and long-time strong advocate for
individual rights,3 2 takes the position that "the promoted em-
ployee should be given an opportunity to be heard," and that
the arbitrator should refuse to proceed with the arbitration
hearing until the junior promoted employee is notified of a
right to attend the arbitration hearing and is given the right to
be heard.33
Nevertheless, in actual practice, it is a rare arbitrator who
follows this view. Most arbitrators believe that such a proce-
dure is not normal nor necessary. At meetings of veteran arbi-
trators, they have been asked by the present author how many
have arbitrated cases involving a union claim that a senior em-
ployee should have been promoted rather than a junior em-
ployee. All of these arbitrators had heard such routine cases.
34
The arbitrators were then asked whether they had refused to
proceed with the arbitration hearing until they were assured
31. This problem was raised as far back as 1958 at a meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators. See Wirtz, supra note 1, at 23-25. Intervening developments
show that the matter has not been resolved and that it is still controversial.
32. Examples of scholarly articles on behalf of the individual by Professor Sum-
mers are as follows: Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary
Analysis, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 239 (1960); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agree-
ments AndArbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362 (1962); Summers, Collective Power and Indi-
vidual Rights in the Collective Agreement-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72
YALE L.J. 421 (1963); Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective
Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 14-31 (B. Dennis & G.
Somers eds. 1974); Summers, Individual Rights in Arbitration, ARBITRATION IN PRAC-
TICE 142-59 (A. Zack ed. 1984).
33. Summers, Individual Rights in Arbitration, ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 152-54 (A.
Zack ed. 1984). In 1980 Professor Ben Aaron suggested that the arbitrator should
call the junior promoted employee as the arbitrator's own witness. See Levin, supra
note 2, at 314-15.
34. E.g., response of arbitrators from three states at Arbitrator's Symposium, in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (March 9, 1988).
1989]
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that the junior employee had been given an opportunity to be
present. None of the arbitrators had followed this
procedure .35
The basic position expressed by most arbitrators is that the
employer, who promoted the junior employee, represents the
interests of the junior employee at the arbitration hearing.
Although the employer's interests may not be identical with
those of the promoted employee, most arbitrators properly be-
lieve that in actual practice the employer vigorously defends
the decision that he made in promoting the junior employee
and that the interests of the junior employee are presented ad-
equately to the arbitrator.
There is not much law on this subject. Nevertheless, in a
situation in which an employee was not a grievant in an arbitra-
tion case but whose seniority was reduced as a result of the
arbitration award, thereby causing his layoff from work, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals said:
Petitioner [the employee who was laid of as a result of the
arbitration award] contends, inter alia, that his rights were
denied since he was not given notice of the arbitration hear-
ing and did not appear there. We disagree. There is no
statutory or constitutional right of an employee to be pres-
ent at an arbitration hearing. It appears that the company
fully and adequately defended petitioner's position at the
hearing 3
6
35. The views expressed in this article about actual arbitration procedure do not
purport to be the result of a scientific survey. The understandings of the present
author about arbitration practices have been developed over a period of forty years
of teaching labor law and labor arbitration during which the present author, for the
past thirty-six years, has arbitrated well over 1,000 cases in all parts of the United
States and in parts of Canada. He has served as a member of the Board of Governors
of the National Academy of Arbitrators as well as on other committees of the Na-
tional Academy. As a member and former national chairman of the Labor Law
Group Trust, he has researched and published books (with other members of the
Group) relating to labor arbitration.
It is not unusual for authors of books and articles involving practices in labor
arbitration to rely on discussions with arbitrators. See, e.g., H. SACKS & L.
KURLANTZICK, MISSING WITNESSES, MISSING TESTIMONY AND MISSING THEORIES n.n.
2, 4 & 63 (1988); R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 134-64 (1965)
(chapter six, which deals with problems of procedural regularity, relies heavily on
discussions among arbitrators as to their views, since not many reported cases discuss
these issues). Likewise, the present author relies on discussions with arbitrators in all
parts of the United States about their practices as well as the published literature in
the field.
36. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
1003 (1964).
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The same reasoning could properly be deemed to be applica-
ble to a promotion case in which the promoted junior em-
ployee claims that he should have a legal right to be present at
the arbitration hearing where the union protests his promotion
and supports the senior bidder for the job.
An argument may be made that the arbitrator has a duty to
maintain the integrity of the arbitration process, and that the
arbitrator therefore must affirmatively seek to determine
whether the union has complied with its duty of fair represen-
tation. Since a union owes a duty of fair representation to a
junior promoted employee as well as to a senior bidder for the
job, it may be argued that the arbitrator should refuse to pro-
ceed with the arbitration hearing until he is assured that the
junior promoted employee has been given an opportunity to
be present at the arbitration hearing.
The Rhode Island case of Belanger v. Mattesons7 is sometimes
cited in support of the view that a court will vacate an arbitra-
tion award where the union does not consider the interests of
the junior promoted employee and that the arbitrator, there-
fore, has a greater responsibility to be concerned about the ad-
judication of individual rights.3 8 However, a close reading of
this case shows that it does not support this proposition. In
fact, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island disagreed with the
lower court and expressly refused to vacate the arbitration
award. 39
In Belanger, two teachers applied to fill a vacancy in the
school system. When the junior employee was promoted, the
senior employee's grievance was processed to arbitration. 40
Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement the
board of arbitration upheld the grievance. The junior em-
ployee who was displaced as a result of the arbitration award
brought suit to vacate the award. Although the court found
that the union had violated its duty of fair representation be-
37. 115 R.I. 332, 346 A.2d 124 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
38. Summers, supra note 33, at 147-48.
39. Belanger, 115 R.I. at 344-47, 346 A.2d at 137-38.
40. Id. at 334-35, 346 A.2d at 127-28. Cf Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co.,
619 F.2d 1229, 1250 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). In Hussmann
the court criticized the union for blind adherence to a policy of favoring employees
with greater seniority. The court, however, demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the
reasons why unions have such strong beliefs about the role of seniority and a lack of
knowledge of the realities of collective bargaining relationships. See id. at 1250, n.3.
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cause the union did not check on the relative qualifications of
the applicants to fill the job vacancy before proceeding to arbi-
tration, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island refused to vacate
the arbitration award. 4' Since the court found that the em-
ployer's position at the arbitration hearing was coextensive
with that of the junior promoted employee and that the em-
ployer had forcefully presented the employee's position, the
court held that the union's breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion in this type of situation did not justify vacating the arbitra-
tion award. 42 Although the junior employee testified on his
own behalf at the arbitration hearing (a fairly unusual proce-
dure), the court did not put any special emphasis on this fact.43
The Rhode Island court expressly rejected the Wisconsin
view,44 expressed in the old case of Clark v. Hein Werner Corp.45
The Clark court held that "[e]mployees not fairly represented
by the union should never be put in the position of having to
solely depend upon the employer championing their rights
under the collective bargaining contract." 46 In this Wisconsin
case some production employees who had been promoted to
supervisory positions later returned to the production bargain-
ing unit. A dispute arose between the union and the company
over whether these employees had continued to accrue senior-
ity. Employees who were laid off as a result of the supervisors'
return to the bargaining unit filed a grievance in protest, which
the union processed to arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the
grievance. In response, the supervisors who were not present
at the arbitration hearing because they had not received spe-
cific notice of it brought an action in court to enjoin enforce-
ment of the arbitration award. This was based solely on the
contention that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction. 47
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the supervisors
were not bound by the arbitration award because they had not
been given proper notice of the arbitration hearing. 48 Ironi-
cally, in the course of finding that the arbitration award was
41. Belanger, 115 R.I. at 350, 346 A.2d at 138.
42. Id. at 346-47, 346 A.2d at 132-35.
43. Id. at 348-49, 346 A.2d at 134.
44. Id. at 346, 346 A.2d at 133.
45. 8 Wis.2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
46. Id. at 275, 99 N.W.2d at 138.
47. Id. at 269, 99 N.W.2d at 134.
48. Id. at 275, 99 N.W.2d at 138.
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not binding because of a procedural deficiency in the arbitra-
tion process, the court engaged in the questionable procedure
of deciding the case on the basis of a claim which was not made
by the plaintiffs and apparently was not argued by the parties.
This left unanswered the only contention raised by the plain-
tiffs-that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction.
The basic facts of the Clark case are almost identical with one
of six problems used by National Academy of Arbitrators
members W. Willard Wirtz, Benjamin Aaron and R.W. Flem-
ing as a basis for discussion by arbitrators in meetings held in
various metropolitan areas in 1959 and 1960. Their report is a
survey of these meetings which were designed to ascertain the
reaction of arbitrators to the problems presented.49 The re-
port stated that the arbitrators uniformly believed that the lack
of notice to a supervisor of the arbitration hearing on the
grievance of the employee who was displaced by the supervisor
did not constitute a due process violation because the arbitra-
tors felt that the company was responsible for representing the
interests of the supervisor. Thus, most of the arbitrators did
not believe that the arbitration award in the Clark case was in-
valid because the union did not, and could not, fairly represent
the former supervisors.
As noted supra,50 the thinking of most arbitrators in the late
1980s is consistent with the thinking of the arbitrators ex-
pressed in the 1960 survey. In balancing individual interests
against group interests, most arbitrators do not believe that an
employee is entitled, as a matter of due process to maintain the
integrity of the arbitral process, to notice of an arbitration
hearing or an opportunity to participate in the hearing simply
because the employee probably will be affected by the arbitra-
tion award. Most arbitrators do not believe that it is their duty
to call a promoted junior employee as a witness or to make
sure that he has been given an opportunity to be present at the
arbitration hearing in order to ensure that the union has not
violated its duty of fair representation.
Relevant to the union's duty of fair representation in senior-
ity cases are two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
49. Fleming, Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 69-91 (S.
Pollard ed. 1961).
50. See text supra between notes 33 and 35.
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States which specifically deal with seniority issues. These deci-
sions show the broad range of discretion that a union has re-
garding its duty of fair representation in seniority matters.
One case, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,5' involved a reduction of
the relative seniority of the plaintiff because of a negotiated
grant of seniority credit for military service prior to employ-
ment. This in turn led to a layoff. The Court said:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to
which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individ-
ual employees and classes of employees. The mere exist-
ence of such difference does not make them invalid. The
complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to
be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be al-
lowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the
unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion. 52
The other case, Humphrey v. Moore,53 which involved the
dovetailing of seniority lists following a merger of two compa-
nies, is relevant to the question of the validity of the statement
by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Clark 54 that:
Where the interests of two groups of employees are diamet-
rically opposed to each other and the union espouses the
cause of one in the arbitration, it follows as a matter of law
that there has been no fair representation of the other
group. This is true even though, in choosing the cause...
to espouse, the union acts completely objectively and with
the best of motives.
55
It appears that this proposition of law is no longer valid in light
of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Humphrey that there is
not necessarily any inadequacy of representation any time that
a union represents employees having antagonistic interests. 56
51. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
52. Id. at 338.
53. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). This case involved use of a joint conference committee
consisting of employer and union representatives (but no neutral) to resolve a sen-
iority dispute. The present author concurs with Professor Rabin who "deplores the
fact that these joint committees have been accorded by the Supreme Court the status
of an arbitration tribunal, when they should more properly be viewed as the penulti-
mate step in the grievance procedure, preceding arbitration." See McKelvey, supra
note 1, at 54.
54. 8 Wis.2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132.
55. Id. at 272, 99 N.W.2d at 137.
56. See R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 110, 119-20 (1965).
Fleming notes that Humphrey v. Moore contravenes the view that there "is per se inade-
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The Court expressed this view as follows:
But we are not ready to find a breach of the collective
bargaining agent's duty of fair representation in taking a
good faith position contrary to that of some individuals
whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one
group of employees against that of another.... Just as a
union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances
which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be
free to take a position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor
should it be neutralized when the issue is chiefly between
two sets of employees. Conflict between employees repre-
sented by the same union is a recurrent fact. To remove or
gag the union in these cases would surely weaken the collec-
tive bargaining and grievance processes.
57
III. CLAIM THAT GRIEVANT Is ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF, AND
TO BE PRESENT AT, THE ARBITRATION HEARING
Unlike the basic issue in the preceding section of this article
which deals with possible rights of non-grievant employees who
will be affected by an arbitration award, this section of the arti-
cle deals with the question of whether every grievant is legally
entitled to notice of the arbitration hearing at which that per-
son's grievance will be heard and whether every grievant is le-
gally entitled to be present at the hearing of that person's
grievance. It may surprise some to read that there is no clear
legal answer to this question. Of course, as noted supra,58 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that "[t]here is no
statutory or constitutional right of an employee to be present
at an arbitration hearing." 59 Although this statement was
made in the context of determining whether an employee who
is not listed as a grievant, but who probably will be affected by
the arbitration award, is entitled to be present at the hearing,
quacy of representation any time a union represents employees with adverse inter-
ests." Id. at 119. See also D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 116
(1979) (noting that the Supreme Court in Humphrey rejected the holding in Clark).
57. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. at 349-50. Since the employees who disliked
the settlement of the seniority dispute had notice of the hearing on the matter and
were represented by stewards who attended the hearing, the Court did not have to
rule on whether they were entitled to such procedures. Id. at 350-51.
58. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003
(1964), reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 874 (1964).
59. Id. at 788.
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the question remains as to whether this view should be ex-
tended to apply to a grievant.
A reasonable argument can be made that not all grievants
should have a legal right to notice of and to be present at the
arbitration hearing where their grievance is heard. Examples
involving job classification, seniority, disciplinary suspensions
and discharge will demonstrate the practical complexities of
this matter.
One example involves ajob classification grievance seeking a
higher job class for a job of Boiler House Operator. The
grievance has been signed by the twelve regular incumbents of
the job and by all employees who may serve as temporary in-
cumbents of the job. If the union does not seriously attempt to
notify more than eight of the regular incumbents about the
date of the hearing (two from each shift where a 20-turn per
week schedule is used) and asks only four of these employees
to appear as witnesses at the hearing, have the rights of the
other grievants been violated? Arguably not all of the other
signers of the grievance have a legal right to notice and to be
present at the hearing. This is especially true if, by their pres-
ence at the hearing, the boiler house would have to be shut
down for the day. Moreover, under the job classification pro-
gram, the dispute may primarily concern the employer and the
union as an entity, over the proper relationship of the job in
dispute to other jobs in the wage structure.
Another example involves a seniority grievance. Suppose all
thirty employees of an important department have signed a
seniority grievance involving interpretation of the layoff provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement. It may be reason-
ably argued that not all of the signers of the grievance have a
legal right to notice and to be present at the arbitration hear-
ing that will determine proper interpretation of the contract.
This is particularly true if by attending the hearing the signers'
department would have to be shut down for the day. Perhaps
the same observation is valid where the same thirty employees
have received staggered disciplinary suspensions of ten days
each (because they all engaged in the same conduct in walking
out in breach of the collective bargaining agreement), all have
signed a grievance to protest their suspension, and this griev-
ance is scheduled for arbitration.
For some arbitrators, discharge cases seem to present more
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procedural difficulties. These difficulties have produced a
great diversity of views, among arbitrators, as to how certain
procedural issues should be resolved. One type of discharge
case involves the following problems. Assume that three em-
ployees are involved in one incident (such as fighting) and they
are discharged. They file grievances to protest their dis-
charges, but only two of the three grievants appear at the arbi-
tration hearing. It seems that, at the least out of curiosity,
every arbitrator asks, if not told in advance, why the third
grievant is not present. In this type of case, many arbitrators
have been told by the union that the absent grievant was given
notice of the hearing, but that he has obtained a job with an-
other employer and does not wish to take time off from the
other job to attend the hearing. Where no request for a post-
ponement of the hearing is made by a party (the union or the
employer), it may be reasonably argued that the arbitrator
should proceed with the hearing since an employee ought to
be able to waive any right that he may have to be present at the
hearing. If it subsequently is discovered that the union's an-
swer (as to why the third grievant is absent) was untrue or that
the union had engaged in some other form of bad faith con-
duct, the absent grievant could seek relief against the union for
breach of its duty of fair representation. In that context, a
court or the NLRB could decide whether a specific grievant
had a legal right to appear at the arbitration hearing under the
specific circumstances of that case.
In actual practice, it appears that most arbitrators accept the
union's statement that the absent grievant was notified and
that he chose not to attend the arbitration hearing. These ar-
bitrators then proceed with the hearing. In fact, at least one
veteran arbitrator has proceeded with the hearing in a dis-
charge case where more than one grievant was involved but
where no grievant was present and the union representative
simply asserted that in his judgment his case was so good that
the grievants' presence was not necessary.
On the other hand, a few arbitrators, basing their decision
on a duty to maintain the integrity of the arbitration process,
refuse to accept the union's statement that a discharged griev-
ant does not wish to take time off from a job with another em-
ployer to attend the arbitration hearing. In one such case the
arbitrator telephoned the grievant and told him he had a right
to attend the arbitration hearing. The employee confirmed
19891
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that he did not want to attend the hearing because it would
interfere with his newjob. Such a procedure has some obvious
disadvantages. A telephone call to grievant at his new place of
employment may in itself interfere with grievant's work. It
may distress the grievant and annoy his new employer. More-
over, an arbitrator's challenge of the truthfulness of the union
representative at the outset of the hearing (without any evi-
dence that the union representative is lying) may justifiably
cause the union representative to doubt the impartiality of the
arbitrator.
Another arbitrator insists at the outset of the hearing that a
discharged grievant be present at the hearing, apparently even
though the grievant does not wish to attend the hearing. The
arbitrator insists that the grievant come to the hearing immedi-
ately or that the hearing will be postponed to a date and time
when the discharged grievant will be present.60 Such a proce-
dure causes delay and increases the cost of arbitration pro-
ceedings. In this connection it should be noted that increasing
cost and increasing delays are two of the current criticisms of
the arbitration process. The arbitrator may view the increased
costs as justified. Many parties, however, may reasonably feel
that it should be their decision as to whether to assume the
burden of the increased costs and the inconvenience of such a
delay. The arbitrator could waive his fees for the additional
time, but it is doubtful that many arbitrators would wish to do
SO.
It may be reasonably argued that the grievance of a dis-
charged employee is so distinguishable from grievances involv-
ing basically group interests (such as a job classification
grievance 6' or a seniority grievance) 62 that such a grievant
should be entitled to notice of the arbitration hearing on his
grievance and to be present at the hearing. This is so because
an individual employee has a strong sense of personal identity
with his job. Also, a strong sense of personal dignity usually is
involved with this type of case. A substantial number of arbi-
60. See Levin, supra note 2, at 315. This suggestion that the grievant be present
at the hearing is also posed in Levin.
61. See the example above in this section involving classification of a Boiler
House Operator job.
62. See the example above in this section discussing the seniority grievance in-
volving interpretation of the layoff provision of the collective bargaining agreement.
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trators have expressed the view in informal discussions that
discharge grievances present special problems.
In actual practice, of course, most discharged employees are
given notice, and do in fact appear at the hearing. Neverthe-
less, if a grievant chooses to waive the opportunity to be pres-
ent, most arbitrators believe this does not violate due process.
IV. CLAIM THAT AN ARBITRATOR HAS A LEGAL
RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE UNION
HAS VIOLATED ITS DuTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION
In this section of the article, the question posed is whether
an arbitrator owes a legal duty to grievants and others to ex-
amine the union in sufficient depth at the arbitration hearing
to ascertain whether the union has violated its duty of fair rep-
resentation, a duty it owes to bargaining unit employees.6 3
Some arbitrators believe that the answer is "yes," 64 but many
arbitrators assume that the union is performing its job prop-
erly and is complying with its duty of fair representation (un-
less, of course, evidence to the contrary is disclosed).
Moreover, many arbitrators conduct their hearings under this
assumption even though they know that under the law the arbi-
tration award may be vacated if the union has violated its duty
of fair representation. These arbitrators do not believe that
they have an affirmative duty to take the initiative to examine
the union in depth to determine whether the union has vio-
lated its duty of fair representation.
Much of the current ferment over whether arbitrators should
adopt a more activist role and more control of an arbitration
hearing, even despite the wishes of the parties, stems from the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc.65 In that case the Court addressed judicial
action in vacating an arbitration award where a union breaches
its duty of fair representation.
In Hines, the union protested Anchor Motor Freight's dis-
charge of several truck drivers for alleged dishonesty during
June of 1967. The applicable collective bargaining agreement
required just cause to discharge employees. Anchor's practice
63. See generally McKelvey, supra note 1, at 51; Wirtz, supra note 1, at 1.
64. See Summers, supra note 33, at 148-50.
65. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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was to reimburse drivers for money they spent for lodging
while the drivers were on the road overnight. Anchor claimed
that the drivers had sought reimbursement for motel expenses
in excess of their actual charges by submitting motel receipts
which overstated the actual room charges. At a meeting with
the union and the drivers, Anchor produced these motel re-
ceipts, copies of the motel registration cards showing a lower
room rate, a notarized statement of the motel clerk stating that
the motel registration cards were accurate, and an affidavit of
the motel owner also stating that the motel registration cards
were accurate and that inflated receipts had been furnished to
the drivers. Since the union claimed that the drivers had in
fact paid the amount reflected on the motel receipts and that
they were innocent of any wrongdoing, the case was submitted
to a joint union-company arbitration committee. The drivers
suggested that the motel be investigated. The union represen-
tative replied that "there was nothing to worry about" 66 and
that it was not necessary for them to hire a private attorney.
At the arbitration hearing the drivers denied that they were
guilty of any dishonesty. However, no other evidence was
presented by the drivers or the union to contradict the com-
pany's written evidence. The arbitration committee sustained
the discharges. The drivers then retained a private attorney.
The attorney obtained a statement from the motel owner that
he had no personal knowledge of the events, but that it was
possible that the discrepancy between the motel receipts and
the motel registration cards could have been caused by the
motel clerk's recording on the registration cards less than the
drivers actually paid (with the clerk retaining the difference be-
tween the amount of the receipt and the amount recorded).
Nevertheless, the private attorney failed to obtain a rehearing
from the arbitration committee on the basis of the speculative
possibility suggested by the new evidence.
The drivers brought an action against Anchor for breach of
contract (based on a claim of no just cause for the discharge)
and an action against the union. The claim against the union
asserted that the falsity of the charges could have been discov-
ered by the union by a "minimum of investigation" and that
the union's failure to investigate properly had arbitrarily and in
bad faith deprived the drivers of employment. One year after
66. Id. at 557.
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the discharges were sustained in arbitration, the private attor-
ney obtained a deposition from the motel clerk, who admitted
that he was the culprit. He admitted that he had falsified the
records and that he, not the drivers, had pocketed the differ-
ence between the amounts shown on the motel receipts and
the amount on the registration cards.
The District Judge granted summary judgment for both
Anchor and the union. The court held that, at worst, the union
had demonstrated bad judgment in failing to investigate the
motel but that this failure did not prove a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation.
The drivers appealed. On appeal, the court held that sum-
mary judgment should not have been granted to the union.
The court of appeals held that from the facts in the record, it
was possible to infer arbitrary or bad faith conduct by the
union. Thus, the drivers should have had an opportunity to
prove the charge of breach of the duty of fair representation.
The union did not seek review of this ruling. Because of the
manner in which the issue in this case was presented to the
Supreme Court under the petition for certiorari, the Court as-
sumed without deciding that the reversal of the District Court's
summary judgment for the union was correct and held ,in a 6
to 2 decision, that the summary judgment for Anchor had to be
reversed.
The employer contended that, under the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the arbitration award should be
viewed as final. However, the Court noted that the individuals
were suing the employer for breach of contract for unjust dis-
charge as well as suing the union for breach of its duty of fair
representation. Hence, the Court held that "if [the union's
breach of its duty of fair representation] seriously undermines
the integrity of the arbitral process the union's breach also
removes the bar of the finality provisions of the contract." 67 In
the same vein the Court said "we cannot believe that Congress
intended to foreclose the employee from his § 301 remedy
otherwise available against the employer if the contractual
processes have been seriously flawed by the union's breach of
its duty to represent employees honestly and in good faith and
without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct." 68
67. Id. at 567.
68. Id. at 570.
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Thus, the Court did not consider the arbitration award to be a
bar to the individual drivers' suits under Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act.
In the course of its reasoning the Court stated that:
Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settle-
ment arrangements provided in collective agreements, but
it was anticipated, we are sure, that the contractual machinery
would operate within some minimum levels of integrity. In our
view, enforcement of the finality provision where the arbi-
trator has erred is conditioned upon the Union's having sat-
isfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in
connection with the arbitration proceedings. 69
Perhaps the first observation that should be made about this
case is that the Supreme Court did not find that the union had
violated its duty of fair representation.7 0 Because of the proce-
dural posture of the case the Court assumed that summary
judgment should not have been granted for the union and the
employer, and said that "[pletitioners, if they prove an erroneous
discharge and the Union's breach of duty tainting the decision of the joint
committee, are entitled to an appropriate remedy against the em-
ployer as well as the Union." 71 Moreover, the Court also said
that the "[drivers] are not entitled to relitigate their discharge
merely because they offer newly discovered evidence that the
charges against them were false and that in fact they were fired
without cause." 72 Another observation is that the Court made
a very general reference to minimum levels of integrity when it
said that Congress anticipated that "the contractual machinery
would operate within some minimum levels of integrity."7 3
Nowhere in the Hines opinion is there any specific statement by
the Court that the joint committee, or an independent arbitra-
tor, should take particular steps in this type of case to prevent
injustice to grievants. The Court did not shed any specific
light on what the arbitrator should do, if anything, as distin-
69. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
70. The only specific allegation that might suggest a breach of the union's duty
of fair representation in the handling of the case, as summarized by the court of
appeals, is "the assertion that there existed political antagonism between local union
officials and plaintiffs [the drivers] because of a wildcat strike led by some of the
plaintiffs and a dispute over the appointment of a steward, resulting in denunciation
of plaintiffs as 'hillbillies' by Angelo, the union president." Id. at 559-60 n.4.
71. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 571.
73. Id.
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guished from what the union should do under its duty of fair
representation, to comply with minimum levels of integrity.
Furthermore, the union was not given much guidance by the
Court on what it must do to represent the employees "fairly"
under the duty to represent them "honestly and in good faith
and without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct." 74
Disagreement among arbitrators in this connection is not so
much over the abstract standards set forth in Hines. The disa-
greement among arbitrators is more over what Hines means for
arbitrators in concrete situations. In part, the disagreement
among arbitrators is based upon different views as to the na-
ture of the collective bargaining agreement and different views
as to the nature of the arbitration process.
In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. ,75
the Supreme Court of the United States commented on the na-
ture of a collective bargaining agreement. It said that a "col-
lective bargaining agreement... is more than a contract; it is a
generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the drafts-
men cannot wholly anticipate." 76 Also, in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 77 the Court distinguished the fact-finding process of
arbitration from judicial fact-finding. In doing so, the Court
said:
[T]he fact-finding process in arbitration usually is not
equivalent to judicial fact-finding. The record of the arbi-
tration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of
evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common
to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-
examination, and testimony under oath are often severely
limited or unavailable. 78
74. Id. at 570. Although there has been an increase in the volume of litigation
involving the duty of fair representation and the arbitration process, it is a very rare
case where the individual employee prevails with a complete victory. See McKelvey,
supra note 1, at 54.
75. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960) (dealing with specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate under
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act).
76. Id. at 578. In its discussion of collective bargaining agreements, the Court
paid great heed to the discussion contained in Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in
Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1004-05 (1955).
77. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that a victim
of alleged racial discrimination is not bound by an arbitration award and may insti-
tute an action de novo in court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the
alleged racial discrimination).
78. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58.
1989]
25
Sherman: The Role and Rights of the Individual in Labor Arbitration
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Thus, whatever the Court had in mind in Hines when it referred
to "minimum levels of integrity," 79 it appears from Warrior and
Gulf that the Court does not expect the parties and the arbitra-
tor in a labor arbitration case to follow procedures that would
be applicable in a breach of contract action filed in court for
breach of a commercial contract.8 0 Moreover, it is apparent
from a reading of Alexander that the Court does not expect the
parties and the arbitrator, even where an alleged violation of a
collective bargaining agreement is involved in a labor arbitra-
tion case, to engage in the same type of fact-finding process
that would be involved in a judicial fact-finding process.8 1
In light of these observations it is not at all clear that the
union, the employees, the company or the arbitration commit-
tee in Hines were acting in bad faith or were "at fault." The
union apparently relied in good faith on the receipts obtained
from the motel by the drivers to show that they paid the
amounts for which they sought reimbursement, just as the
drivers relied in good faith on these receipts. The company
relied in good faith on the discrepancy between these receipts
and the amounts on the motel registration cards, and the arbi-
tration committee believed, in weighing the evidence, that the
company's evidence was more credible.
Did the arbitration committee have a legal obligation in
Hines to do something more to assure that "the contractual ma-
chinery would operate within some minimum levels of integ-
rity[?]" 8 2 Should the arbitration committee have criticized the
company for relying on a notarized statement of the motel
clerk (a critical part of the company's evidence) rather than try-
ing to bring the motel clerk (from some out-of-town location)
to testify as a live witness so that he could be cross-examined?
Should the arbitration committee have criticized the union for
not trying to bring the motel clerk from the out-of-town loca-
tion to the arbitration hearing? Of course, the motel clerk un-
doubtedly would have resisted any attempt to bring him to the
hearing, and it may have been impractical to try to compel him
to travel a long distance. Moreover, although it is common for
a party in labor arbitration to rely on notarized statements and
79. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. at 571.
80. Warrior and Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581-83.
81. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57.
82. Hines, 424 U.S. at 571.
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affidavits, it is also common for the other party, the union in
this case, to contend that the testimony of live witnesses such
as the drivers, who are subject to cross examination, should be
given more weight by the arbitrator where there is a conflict
between a notarized statement and the testimony of live wit-
nesses with first-hand knowledge of the critical evidence, in
this case the validity of motel receipts. Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that the union in Hines did believe, or at least could have
believed, in good faith that it would prevail in arbitration on
the basis of the testimony of its live witnesses.
Did the union have a legal obligation to attempt to obtain a
deposition from the motel clerk prior to the arbitration hear-
ing? Probably not. At that time the clerk had only recently
stated his position on the notarized statement. No court action
had been filed, and as the Supreme Court stated in Alexander, in
arbitration proceedings "rights and procedures common to
civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process [and] cross-
examination . . . are often severely limited or unavailable.-
8 3
After the arbitration award had been rendered, the private at-
torney retained by the drivers instituted lawsuits against
Anchor and the union. Although he alleged that the falsity of
the charges against the drivers could have been discovered by
the union with a "minimum of investigation," 84 the record
shows that it was not until one year after the discharges of the
drivers were sustained in arbitration that the private attorney
resorted to judicial fact-finding procedures, deposed the motel
clerk, and obtained a confession. If only a "minimum of inves-
tigation" was involved, as the attorney alleged, one may won-
der why it took him so long to obtain the deposition. Thus, it
appears that the position of the District Court in Hines was
valid when it held that "at most" the union had demonstrated
bad judgment when it did not investigate the motel, but that
this did not prove a breach of the union's duty of fair represen-
tation. 85 It is also unlikely that the arbitration committee could
have done anything significant that was both practical and
within the scope of its authority to provide greater assurance
that the "minimum levels of integrity" test86 would be met in
83. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58.
84. Hines, 424 U.S. at 558.
85. Id. at 559.
86. Id. at 571.
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this case.
Of course, the innocent drivers who suffered a loss of earn-
ings as a result of their discharge had a legal remedy for dam-
ages in a tort action for deceit against the motel clerk and a
legal remedy for damages against the motel owner under the
doctrine of respondeat superior (the employer is liable for the
torts of his employee committed within the scope of the em-
ployee's employment). In fact, under some modern theories of
tort law Anchor and the union, who were innocent victims of
the fraud of the motel clerk as well as the truck drivers, could
prevail in an action of fraud against the motel clerk and in a
vicarious liability action against the clerk's employer. One
such tort theory is set forth in section 531 of the Restatement,
Second of Torts,87 which provides as a general rule:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject
to liability to the persons or class of persons whom he in-
tends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from action
in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss
suffered by them through their justifiable reliance in the
type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to ex-
pect their conduct to be influenced.8 8
Recognition of the availability of a tort remedy to the drivers
makes it somewhat easier to accept the possible result in Hines
that the drivers who were innocent of any wrongdoing would
have no remedy against the union or the company. This fol-
lows under the Court's reasoning in Hines if the drivers were
unable to establish a breach of the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation. Since a common reaction is that the drivers should
have some remedy for the injustices they suffered, the availa-
bility of the tort remedy alleviates a feeling of unfairness that
might arise if the drivers had no remedy.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1977).
88. Id. It should be noted that the American Law Institute adds the following
"caveat" to this section of the Restatement: "The Institute expresses no opinion on
whether the liability of the maker of a fraudulent representation may extend beyond
the rule stated in this Section to other persons or other types of transactions, if reli-
ance upon the representation in acting or in refraining from action may reasonably
be foreseen." Id. Extension of the ambit of liability for misrepresentation beyond
those in contractual privity to persons a misrepresenter should reasonably foresee as
relying on the misrepresentation was recognized in Michigan in Williams v. Polgar,
391 Mich. 6, 9-18, 215 N.W.2d 149, 150-53 (1974). The Williams court reviewed the
law on this point in many other jurisdictions. Although this case deals with the liabil-
ity for misrepresentation in a title abstract, the reasoning could be deemed to be
applicable to the company and the union in Hines.
(Vol. 15
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Perhaps the Court in Hines should not have held that the
availability of a remedy for the drivers against the company de-
pended on whether the union breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation. The Court could have noted that the drivers had
complied with its decision in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox8 9 and
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 90 and determined that no
one except the motel clerk was at fault but that the company
did not in fact have just cause under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement to discharge the drivers in light of the
evidence subsequently discovered after the arbitration award
had been rendered. Moreover, the critical evidence on which
the company relied to establish just cause was not only false
but was tainted by the surreptitious fraud of an employee of
another employer. The Court could then have held that these
very unusual circumstances presented a narrow exception to
the holding in Vaca v. Sipes9 l that an employee must establish a
breach of duty of fair representation by the union as well as a
breach of contract by the employer in order to prevail against
the employer. This would have allowed the drivers to obtain
an appropriate judicial remedy. The Court could have phrased
a very narrow exception and cautioned that it was a narrow
exception, just as it did in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras92 when it said that "we hold that the ac-
tion falls within the limited exception fashioned in Leedom v.
Kyne.. . ."93 Although Sociedad and Leedom v. Kyne9 4 dealt with
representation proceedings, the technique used by the Court
in those cases could have been adopted, by way of analogy, and
applied to the situation in Hines.
Although arbitrators believe that they have an obligation to
conduct a fair hearing, they do not agree on what this concept
89. 379 U.S. 650 (1965). This case involved an employee who sued his employer
in an Alabama state court for severance pay. The court held that, as a general rule,
an employee must attempt to use the grievance procedure in the collective bargain-
ing agreement before bringing suit in state court under section 301 of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act. Id. at 652.
90. Id. at 652. The Court recognized that "[i]f the union refuses to press or only
perfunctorily presses the individual's claim, differences may arise as to the forms of
redress then available." Id. The Court, however, concluded that the union must at
least be afforded an opportunity to act on the employees's behalf. Id. at 653.
91. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
92. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963).
93. Id. at 16.
94. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
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means in actual situations. Disagreements arise in part be-
cause of differing views over the function of the arbitrator. A
few believe that an arbitrator should be very passive, while
some others believe the arbitrator should adopt a very active
role as a participant in the hearing. The procedures used by
most arbitrators fall somewhere in between these two views.
Under the strong-activist view some of the suggested proce-
dures could conflict with the provisions of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes. 95 One suggestion in response to Hines is that the ar-
bitrator should require a transcript of the arbitration hearing if
the arbitrator anticipates potential problems of fair representa-
tion.96 However, although the Code provides that "[a]n arbi-
trator may seek to persuade the parties ... to use a transcript if
the nature of the case appears to require one," 97 the Code also
says that "[m]utual agreement of the parties as to use or non-
use of a transcript must be respected by the arbitrator."98 The Code
states further that "if an arbitrator intends to make his or her
appointment to a case contingent on mutual agreement to a
transcript, that requirement must be made known to both par-
ties prior to appointment." 99 Unfortunately, in most ad hoc ar-
bitration cases the arbitrator knows almost nothing about the
case prior to the arbitration hearing and thus normally is not in
a position to anticipate a problem of fair representation.
Although many arbitrators follow the traditional view that
the arbitration process involves only two parties, the union and
the employer, a few arbitrators think of the process as involv-
ing three parties: the union, the employer and the individ-
ual.' 00 It should be noted that the Code contemplates two
95. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT DISPUTES (1974) [hereinafter cited as CODE]. This Code, as amended, has been
adopted by the National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Associa-
tion and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
96. McKelvey, supra note 1, at 54. See also SACKS & KURLANTZICK, supra note 35, at
10-18 (where the authors support "limited arbitrator activism," a role which they
characterize as "The Educator-Facilitator Role").
97. CODE § 111.
98. CODE § 109 (emphasis added).
99. CODE § Il1 (emphasis omitted).
100. For the traditional view, see the view of Arbitrator Harry Dworkin in Sum-
mers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under The Collective Bargaining Agreement: What
Constitutes Fair Representation?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEET-
ING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS at 57 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds. 1975).
Some of the most articulate arbitrators in America are also some of the most innova-
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parties since it calls for a "hearing which assures that both par-
ties have sufficient opportunity to present their respective evi-
dence and argument."10' Some believe that an arbitrator has a
responsibility to examine each witness, to intervene on behalf
of the grievant to develop the facts, to intervene (where the
union is submitting a weak and perfunctory presentation) by
taking the initiative to ask questions, to request more evidence,
to call witnesses and to ask the parties to explore other sec-
tions of the collective bargaining agreement which they have
not cited.'0 2 Although each of these devices has been used in
arbitration at one time or another, most arbitrators are reluc-
tant to proceed very far along this line because to do so may
conflict with Code provisions which state that "[e]ssential per-
sonal qualifications of an arbitrator include.., impartiality" 103
and that "[a]n arbitrator must demonstrate ability to exercise
these personal qualifications faithfully and with good judg-
ment, both in procedural matters and in substantive deci-
sions."' 4 Of course, these provisions of the Code do not
preclude an arbitrator from seeking "to clarify" the presenta-
tions of the parties (as distinguished from "making a case" for
one of the parties), and the technique of "clarification" can be
utilized in some depth.' 0 5
tive arbitrators, particularly on procedural matters. It seems that such arbitrators as
Professor Clyde Summers of the University of Pennsylvania and Professor Ted Jones
of UCLA, who are prolific and articulate writers, were just as innovative before Hines
as after. See Hines, 424 U.S. at 554. For a list of some of Professor Summers' publica-
tions before and after Hines, see supra note 32.
101. CODE § 105 (emphasis added).
102. See McKelvey, supra note 1, at 54. The February 1, 1987 Agreement between
the USS Division of USX Corporation and the United Steelworkers of America for
production and maintenance employees provides in Section 7(A)(5) that -[t]he Com-
pany agrees that it shall not subpoena or call as a witness in arbitration proceedings
any employee or retiree from a production and maintenance or salaried clerical and
technical bargaining unit in the plant from which the grievance arises." Collective
Bargaining Agreement, USS Division of USX Corporation and the United Steelwork-
ers of America, Production and Maintenance Employees (1987). The agreement also
states that "[tihe union agrees that it shall not subpoena or call as a witness in such
proceedings any non-bargaining unit employee or retiree." Id. But the arbitrator is
not precluded from calling such persons as witnesses. In actual practice, however,
the arbitrator rarely exercises this power.
103. CODE § 11.
104. CODE § 12.
105. Under the concept of "clarification" the arbitrator may in fact seek "amplifi-
cation" of the testimony of a witness. Some prominent arbitrators properly support
"an activist position on asking amplifying questions of a witness." See SACKS &
KURLANTZICK, supra note 35, at 53-61.
1989]
31
Sherman: The Role and Rights of the Individual in Labor Arbitration
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
Some arbitrators have tremendous confidence in their own
ability to resolve matters through arbitration, making resort to
the courts unnecessary. Although it is desirable to keep the
judiciary out of such matters as much as is fair and practical,
arbitrators should be realistic and recognize that the judicial
fact-finding process is superior to the arbitral fact-finding pro-
cess in some instances. Arbitrators should concede that the
type of factual situation exemplified in Hines, involving surrep-
titious fraud by an employee of another employer, did not lend
itself to adequate fact-finding under normal arbitral
procedures.
V. CLAIM THAT AN ARBITRATOR HAS A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
SUGGESTIONS FOR AN "INFORMED AWARD"
In 1970, the present author published two articles dealing
with a labor arbitrator's duty of disclosure. These articles were
based on a nation-wide survey of labor arbitrators, union rep-
resentatives and management representatives.10 6 The survey
consisted of thirty questions, the last three of which were as
follows:
Does A Labor Arbitrator Have A Duty to Disclose-
[1] That a Union representative has advised the arbitra-
tor that he agrees with the Company's position [but
that a hearing must be held for "political" reasons],
and that the Union representative has asked the arbitra-
tor to agree in advance of the hearing to adopt the
Company position?
[2] Same question as #[1] except that the arbitrator is
not asked to make a commitment on the decision that
he will render.
[3] That on a plant visit, after the hearing, the Union
representative, who presented the Union's case, indi-
cates that he has done his best in presenting the case
but that he will understand if the arbitrator rules in
favor of the Company under the Contract? 0 7
Respondents to the questionnaire could answer "yes," "no,"
106. Sherman, Labor Arbitrator's Duty of Disclosure, 31 U. Prrr L. REV. 377 (1970);
Sherman, Arbitrator's Duty of Disclosure-Sequel, 32 U. Prrr. L. REV. 167 (1970).
107. Survey of Labor Arbitrators, Union Representatives and Management Repre-
sentatives (1970). Similar questions were raised in 1958 by W. Willard Wirtz at the
Eleventh Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators. See Wirtz, supra
note 1, at 27-30.
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or "it depends" to each question. More arbitrators, union rep-
resentatives and company representatives answered "yes" than
"no" to question No. 1, and more answered "no" than "yes"
to question No. 2. All three categories (arbitrators, union rep-
resentatives and company representatives) overwhelmingly an-
swered "no" to question No. 3.108
As noted in the articles published by the author in 1970,
"[w]hen arbitrators are asked what information they should
disclose to the parties, they frequently respond on the basis of
unarticulated premises concerning the role of the arbitrator.
Their answers tend to reflect varying underlying premises." 0 9
When arbitrators do articulate their premises, some will say
there is a duty to disclose because "an arbitrator is like a
judge." Other arbitrators respond that an arbitrator, unlike a
judge, is a creature of parties in a private process, and he can
properly help the parties solve an industrial relations problem
arising out of political problems within the union without any
disclosures." 0 The answer of some arbitrators is that there is a
duty of disclosure in a case involving individual rights, such as
discharge, but that there is no duty of disclosure in a case in-
volving contract interpretation affecting all employees the
same. Still other arbitrators believe that an ad hoc arbitrator
has greater duties of disclosure than a permanent umpire.
In 1974, the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitra-
tors of Labor-Management Disputes was promulgated. This
Code contains several provisions which are relevant to the
three questions excerpted from the author's 1970 survey.
In the first of these three questions, the arbitrator is asked by
the union representative to make a commitment to adopt the
company position. This situation is similar to the "rigged
108. Sherman, Labor Arbitrator's Duty of Disclosure, supra note 106, at 400.
109. Id. at 382-83.
110. Relevant to the role of the arbitrator in the situation where the parties tell the
arbitrator what award they want is the following comment:
Some view [the arbitration process] as an extension of collective bargaining,
in which case it is an act of statesmanship for the arbitrator to help the com-
pany and the union arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution. Others believe
it is more nearly ajudicial proceeding, in which case the rules of due process
familiar to the courts apply .... [Nevertheless] there are a host of court
matters in which the judge accepts the advice of counsel for the two sides as
to an acceptable solution, though this fact is not always known to the clients
of the respective counsel. Divorce suits, juvenile proceedings, mental health
cases, and other examples could be cited.
Fleming, supra note 49, at 89..
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award" where the parties jointly request, prior to the hearing,
that the arbitrator make a commitment to adopt the company
position in his arbitration award. Most arbitrators would re-
fuse to make such a commitment because it would probably be
viewed as a violation of Paragraphs 11, 12, and 18 of the
Code."' Paragraph 11 includes "honesty" and "integrity"
among the important personal qualifications of an arbitra-
tor. 12 Paragraph 12 continues with the provision that an arbi-
trator "must demonstrate these personal qualities faithfully
and with good judgment." ' 1 3 Paragraph 18 states that "[a]n
arbitrator must uphold the dignity and integrity of the office
and endeavor to provide effective service to the parties."' 
1 4
Despite these provisions of the Code, other provisions per-
mit what some "purists" might describe as "rigged awards."
Other commentators describe these as "informed consent"
awards. "Consent awards" are permitted in some circum-
stances. Paragraph 65 of the Code provides that:
Prior to issuance of an award, the parties may jointly re-
quest the arbitrator to include in the award certain agree-
ments between them, concerning some or all of the issues.
If the arbitrator believes that a suggested award is proper,
fair, sound, and lawful, it is consistent with professional re-
sponsibility to adopt it.
115
Nevertheless, Paragraph 66 of the Code, which is a subsec-
tion, contains the following cautions:
Before complying with such a request, an arbitrator must
be certain that he or she understands the suggested settle-
ment adequately in order to .. .appraise its terms. If it
appears that pertinent facts or circumstances may not have
been disclosed, the arbitrator should take the initiative to
assure that all significant aspects of the case are fully under-
stood. To this end, the arbitrator may request additional
specific information and may question witnesses at a
hearing. 116
If the "informed consent" award meets the qualifications of
111. See CODE §§ 11, 12 & 18 (requiring an arbitrator to be honest, impartial and
have integrity).
112. CODE § 11.
113. CODE § 12.
114. CODE § 18.
115. CODE§65.
116. CODE §66.
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Paragraphs 65 and 66 of the Code, then it seems that the
award probably would not violate Paragraphs 11, 12 and 18 of
the Code concerning the use of integrity in arbitration. More-
over, it appears that the award probably would not violate Par-
agraph 26 of the Code. Paragraph 26 provides that an
arbitrator has an obligation to recognize diversity in arbitra-
tion arrangements and to try to understand the principles gov-
erning the arbitration system in which he or she is serving. It
also states that: "Such understanding does not relieve an arbi-
trator from a corollary responsibility to seek to discern and re-
fuse to lend approval or consent to any collusive attempt by the
parties to use arbitration for an improper purpose. 17
"Collusive" may be defined as "secretly arranged for fraudu-
lent purposes.""l 8  Thus, not all secret arrangements are
banned by Paragraph 26. Paragraph 26 when read in conjunc-
tion with Paragraph 65 of the Code suggests that a secret ar-
rangement under which the arbitrator incorporates certain
agreements of the parties in his award is permissible if this is
done for a proper purpose, and if the qualifications of
Paragraphs 65 and 66 are met.
If the union representative advises the arbitrator prior to the
arbitration hearing that he agrees with the company's position
in the case and that no commitment is requested,' l9 the arbi-
trator is free to decide for the union if the evidence indicates
that the union should prevail. In this situation views of arbitra-
tors vary. Some arbitrators feel that whether any action should
be taken depends on the nature of the case. Others believe
that they should withdraw from serving as an arbitrator in such
a case. Still others feel that they have a duty of disclosure to
the company and/or the grievant.
Many arbitrators make a distinction between the arbitration
of a discharge case, involving "rights" arbitration under a col-
lective bargaining agreement, and arbitration of new or revised
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, involving "inter-
est" arbitration. Many arbitrators believe that "an informed
award" is proper and that there is no duty of disclosure in the
117. CODE § 26 (emphasis added).
118. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (lst ed. 1969).
119. See Question 2, Survey of Labor Arbitrators, Union Representatives and
Management Representatives (1969), supra note 107 and accompanying text. See also
Sherman, Labor Arbitrator's Duty of Disclosure, supra note 106, at 383.
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latter type of case. When a representative of one of the parties
tells the arbitrator that the other party's position is "very rea-
sonable," such a statement in that situation is often viewed as
an act of a "statesman." One difficulty with this distinction is
that under the Scope of the Code it is stated that: "This Code
is a privately developed set of standards of professional behav-
ior. It applies to voluntary arbitration of labor-management
grievance disputes and of disputes concerning new or revised contract
terms. Both 'ad hoc' and 'permanent' varieties of voluntary ar-
bitration, private and public sector, are included."' 20 The pre-
amble tends to reject a distinction between a discharge case
and a case involving a revised wage structure. Perhaps the
practical differences between the two types of cases can be rec-
ognized in light of Paragraph 25 of the Code. Paragraph 25
states that "[r]ecognition of special features of a particular ar-
bitration arrangement can be essential with respect to proce-
dural matters and may influence other aspects of the
arbitration process."'
2 '
Use of a tripartite board, consisting of a partisan union-ap-
pointed arbitrator, a partisan employer-appointed arbitrator
and a neutral arbitrator, poses special problems. After an arbi-
tration hearing before a tripartite board, it is common for the
three arbitrators to hold an executive session to discuss con-
templated procedures and to make comments on the substance
of the case. Suppose that at one such executive session a
union-appointed arbitrator remarks, "to be frank and honest,
the union has a loser.... I know that the company has to win,
but you understand that I'll have to be listed on the award as
dissenting from the award." Would the Code apply in such a
situation? The Code in its Preamble states that it "does not
apply to partisan representatives on tripartite boards."' 122 The
provisions of Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Code concerning
"integrity" and "impartiality" clearly do not apply to the parti-
san arbitrators. But, does the neutral arbitrator in the hypo-
thetical case have a duty to disclose to grievants and to the rest
of the union what the union-appointed arbitrator said?'
23
120. CODE § 4 (emphasis added).
121. CODE§25.
122. CODE § 6.
123. Suppose that the roles were reversed and the company-appointed arbitrator
on the tripartite board said in the executive session: "To be frank and honest, the
company has a loser.... I know that the union has to win, but you understand that
[Vol. 15
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Most neutral arbitrators would undoubtedly be surprised if
they were told that they had a duty to disclose such a state-
ment, and would probably disagree that any such duty existed.
A union-appointed arbitrator on a tripartite board is viewed
as a partisan representative, and is so characterized by the
Code. 124 Is there any significant difference between a situation
where a union representative makes a statement to a neutral
arbitrator in the presence of a company representative on the
board and a situation where no arbitration board is used but a
key union representative (perhaps the union representative
who presented the union's case at the hearing) makes essen-
tially the same statement to a single neutral arbitrator in the
presence of a key company representative? For example, the
union representative might say, after the hearing: "To be hon-
est and frank, I know that I have a loser .... I know that the
company has to win this case." Of course, there is a difference
of procedure where a tripartite board is used and where no
such board is used, but one might ask whether the difference is
more of form than substance. Nevertheless, the Code could be
interpreted to distinguish between the two situations on the
question of an arbitrator's duty of disclosure. This is so be-
cause the Code in its Preamble states that the Code does not
apply to partisan representatives of tripartite boards.
It is not clear whether the Code permits a distinction to be
drawn, for purposes of ascertaining whether there is a duty of
disclosure, between a grievance dispute over whether a provi-
sion in a collective bargaining agreement for a revised wage
structure is to be made retroactive to an earlier date (where the
award would be made applicable to all employees) and a griev-
ance dispute over whether an employer had just cause under a
collective bargaining agreement to discharge an employee. In
this connection it should be noted that the Committee on Pro-
fessional Responsibility and Grievances of the National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators has issued a series of Advisory Opinions on
the meaning of the Code, and that Opinion No.6, dated June
I'll have to be listed on the award as dissenting from the award." Should the neutral
arbitrator be deemed to have a duty to disclose to the production supervisors who
were responsible for the alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement
what the company-appointed arbitrator said? Most arbitrators would undoubtedly
say "no."
124. CODE § 6.
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10, 1980,125 deals with the subject of "Arbitrator's Duty Re-
garding Off-the-Record Union Representative's Remarks Prej-
udicial to Grievant in Discharge Case." The facts as stated in
Opinion No. 6 are as follows:
Prior to the start of a discharge hearing, the Union repre-
sentative approached the arbitrator and remarked, out of
earshot of the Company representative: "I've got a loser. I
don't expect to win this one." The arbitrator admonished
[the union representative] that he had misbehaved, and that
his remarks could prejudice the grievant's rights. The arbi-
trator stated that he would excise the remarks from his eval-
uation of the dispute and would decide the case on its
merits without regard to them. Before the hearing began,
the arbitrator disclosed to the Company the Union repre-
sentative's remarks and the arbitrator's response. Neither
the Company nor the Union interposed any objection to the
arbitrator's continued service in the case.'
26
The Opinion states that the issues are: "What is the arbitra-
tor's duty in such a case with respect to disclosure to the griev-
ant and withdrawal?"' 127 In the discussion, the Opinion
distinguishes between a joint effort by the parties in a dis-
charge case to induce the arbitrator to sustain the discharge
and a unilateral effort by the union to induce the arbitrator to
sustain a discharge. The Opinion describes the professional
responsibility duties of the arbitrator in these situations as
follows:
[I]n a discharge case, where the parties make ajoint effort
to induce the arbitrator to sustain the discharge, this consti-
tutes a collusive attempt by the parties to use arbitration for
an improper purpose. The arbitrator has a responsibility to
seek to discern such an effort. Where the arbitrator dis-
cerns such an effort, continued service by the arbitrator in
the case without the informed consent of the discharged
employee constitutes a lending of approval or consent to
such a collusive attempt in violation of Paragraph 26, also
constitutes a failure to uphold the dignity and integrity of
the office in violation of Paragraph 18, and is inconsistent
with the essential personal qualifications of honesty and in-
tegrity referred to in Paragraphs 11 and 12 [of the Code].
125. National Academy of Arbitrators Committee on Professional Responsibility
and Grievances, Formal Op. 6 (1980).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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A unilateral effort by the Union to induce an arbitrator to
sustain a discharge constitutes an attempt, albeit not a col-
lusive attempt, to use arbitration for an improper purpose.
A failure by the arbitrator to seek to discern such an effort
by the Union, or continued service by the arbitrator without
the informed consent of the discharged employee in a case
where the arbitrator discerns such a Union effort, is not vio-
lative of Paragraph 26, but does constitute a failure to up-
hold the dignity and integrity of the office in violation of
Paragraph 18, and is inconsistent with the essential per-
sonal qualifications of honesty and integrity referred to in
Paragraphs 11 and 12.128
The Opinion recognizes that the remarks of the union repre-
sentative may require interpretation by the arbitrator. In the
following paragraphs the Opinion recognizes this possibility
and states what the arbitrator should do about it:
Remarks like those made by the Union representative to
the arbitrator in the instant case may or may not reflect an
effort by the Union to induce the arbitrator to sustain the
discharge. The arbitrator has a duty to make an honest
judgment, based upon his experience and his knowledge of
the facts and circumstances, as to whether they do reflect
such an effort by the Union. If in his judgment they do re-
flect such an effort by the Union, he should not continue to
serve without the informed consent of the discharged em-
ployee. It is noted that the arbitrator has the option of with-
drawal without disclosure and without giving a specific
reason, and that he might find this course to be the one
least likely to harm the discharged employee and the collec-
tive bargaining relationship.
In addition to making a judgment as to whether the
Union representative's remarks reflect an effort by the
Union to induce the arbitrator to sustain the discharge, the
arbitrator must also make a judgment as to whether he can
effectively disregard the remarks in weighing the evidence
and arriving at a decision in the case. If he sincerely be-
lieves that he can disregard them and do full justice to the
parties and to the discharged employee, the fact that they
were made does not in and of itself require his withdrawal.
If he does not sincerely believe that he can disregard the
remarks and judge honestly and fairly on the evidence prop-
erly before him, the Code requirements of "honesty" and
128. Id.
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"integrity" necessitate his withdrawal. 129
The Opinion may be viewed as significant not only for what
it does say but also for what it does not say. The Opinion goes
beyond the facts of the case when it says that "[t]he basic con-
clusions stated herein are equally applicable to both ad hoc and
permanent arbitrators."'' 30 On the other hand, the Opinion
seems to be carefully restricted, in terms of type of case, to a
discharge case. In the statement of general subject matter at
the outset of the Opinion, and in the statement of facts, the
issues and the essence of the reasoning refer to a discharge
case. It is interesting to note that there seems to be a con-
scious effort in the Opinion not to go beyond the obligations
of the arbitrator in a discharge case. Perhaps in recognition of
the varying views among arbitrators as to what duties, if any,
an arbitrator may have when the grievance is applicable to all
employees in the bargaining unit, the Opinion seems to have
left this question open. In the latter type of case some differ-
ent considerations would be involved. For example, would the
arbitrator, in order to continue to serve as an arbitrator, have
to obtain the informed consent from every employee in the
bargaining unit? On this type of issue the applicable rules are
still evolving.
This section of the article has been largely devoted to a dis-
cussion of the arbitrator's duty of disclosure of suggestions for
an "informed award." Also relevant to this discussion is the
union's duty of fair representation. Should a union be deemed
to have violated its duty, which under Vaca v. Sipes '1 requires
proof of union conduct that was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or
in bad faith,"' 1 2 any time that a union representative makes
suggestions to a neutral arbitrator that may be more in line
with the employer's view of the case than the union's view of
the case? It is doubtful that an unqualified answer of "yes" to
this broad and sweeping question would be valid. It seems
that many of the distinctions discussed in connection with the
arbitrator's professional responsibilities are also relevant to
the question of the union's duty of fair representation. This
includes a possible distinction between a discharge case, or
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
132. Id. at 190.
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other case involving very personal individual rights, and a case
involving an interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment which would be equally applicable to everybody in the
bargaining unit.
One final question concerning damages should be consid-
ered. Even if the arbitrator has not disclosed suggestions
made to him for an informed award and even if the union is
found to have violated its duty of fair representation in a dis-
charge case by making suggestions, what are the damages to
the individual if the evidence shows that the employer had just
cause to discharge the individual? Probably not very substan-
tial. In addition, it must be remembered that, in order to re-
cover damages from the employer, the individual must prove
not only the union's breach of duty of fair representation, but
also the lack of just cause for the discharge by the employer
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.13 3
Thus, the individual has a "hard row to hoe" in these types of
cases.
VI. CLAIM THAT AN EMPLOYEE Is ENTITLED TO BE
REPRESENTED BY PERSONAL COUNSEL, AS WELL AS BY
THE UNION, AT THE ARBITRATION HEARING
Although no claim is made in most cases that an individual
grievant is legally entitled to be represented at the arbitration
hearing by private counsel of his own choosing as well as by
the union, many veteran arbitrators have been faced with such
a claim. When the claim does arise, most arbitrators try to me-
diate the problem so that no formal ruling needs to be made
by the arbitrator on this issue.' 3 4 An attempt is often made by
the arbitrator to get the union and the employer to agree to
allow some degree of participation by grievant's private
counsel. ' 3 5
Two examples may be cited. In one discharge case I was the
first person to arrive at the hotel hearing room. When a sec-
ond person arrived, I asked him whether he was with the union
133. Id. at 197.
134. See McKelvey, supra note 1, at 52.
135. Kotin, Comment, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 44 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds. 1974). For an
earlier view supporting the claim of the individual for independent counsel, see
Wirtz, supra note 1, at 25.
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or the company. When he replied "neither," I thought he was
in the wrong room. He then told me that he was counsel for
the grievant's family, that he was not a labor lawyer, and that
he was present at the request of the grievant's family. When
union and company representatives arrived, they objected to
the presence of the grievant's lawyer. In mediation efforts I
suggested that the union and the company would be in a
stronger legal position, in the event that the grievant at-
tempted to litigate before a court or the NLRB in relationship
to my award,' 36 if the parties allowed the grievant's attorney to
participate in the arbitration hearing. The parties reluctantly
agreed. However, they could not agree on where the private
counsel should sit since neither party wanted to have grievant's
private counsel as part of its team. Finally, it was agreed that
he would sit at the far end of the union's side of the table. At
the end of the testimony of each of the witnesses, private coun-
sel simply asked a couple of routine questions.
In another case, company and union counsel agreed, with
my approval, that grievant's private counsel could submit
questions to union counsel who would decide whether to ad-
dress these questions to the witnesses. That technique is, in
general, successful, but problems can arise when the union
counsel refuses to ask questions submitted to him by grievant's
private counsel.
When the parties object to participation in the arbitration
hearing by private counsel for the individual, some arbitrators
rule that the private counsel may sit in the room and observe
the hearing, but that he may not participate in the hearing.
Professor Clyde Summers has stated that his "view is that the
individual should be treated as a full party to the proceedings,
with the right to submit evidence, cross-examine witnesses,
and present argument,"' 37 and that the employee should be
allowed to participate with his own lawyer.' 38 Some union at-
torneys agree with this view, and do not object to such full par-
ticipation by the individual through his own attorney at the
arbitration hearing. 139
136. A claim of lack of due process by an individual employee may arise not only
where the grievance is denied, but also where a grievant is not granted the full relief
that he is seeking.
137. Summers, supra note 33, at 154.
138. Id. at 154-55.
139. See, e.g., Asher, Comment, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL
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The Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of
Labor-Management Disputes briefly recognizes the issue, but
takes no position on what ruling the arbitrator should make,
when it states: "Occasionally, special circumstances may re-
quire that an arbitrator rule on such matters as attendance and
degree of participation of counsel selected by grievant." 140
For clarity of analysis it is wise to consider this issue from the
perspective of four different situations: (1) where the union
and company have no objection to participation by grievant's
private counsel; (2) where the union does not object, but the
company objects to participation by grievant's private counsel;
(3) where the union objects, but the company does not object
to participation by grievant's private counsel; and (4) where
both the union and the company object to participation by
grievant's private counsel.
When neither party objects to participation by grievant's pri-
vate counsel at the arbitration hearing, the procedure usually
does not present any serious problem for the arbitrator. Nev-
ertheless, some problems may occur. One problem arises
when there is a conflict over the degree and form of participa-
tion by private counsel. Another problem arises when griev-
ant's private counsel argues for a different interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement from that advanced by the
union.
If only the employer objects to participation by grievant's
private counsel and if the union is willing to accept grievant's
private counsel as part of the union's representation of the
grievant, the issue may be resolved rather easily under the law.
This is so because the National Labor Relations Act grants to
the union the authority to designate its representatives without
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 36 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds 1974);
Webster, COMMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 321-23 (J. Stern & B. Dennis eds. 1981). In contrast, the
IUE allows an individual to bring a personal attorney to the hearing, but the union
controls the questioning of witnesses and asks at the end of the case whether the
personal attorney has other questions. Role of Grievant's Personal Attorney, 128 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) at 567-68 (1988).
140. CODE § 40. According to the views of Arbitrator Charles F. Ipavec, the arbi-
trator "should accede to the wishes of the parties" and exclude the grievant's per-
sonal attorney if both parties feel that the personal attorney should be excluded. See
Role of Grievant's Personal Attorney, supra note 139, at 567.
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interference by the employer.141 Some union counsel welcome
participation by grievant's attorney, as shown by the following
view: "My own practice as union counsel is to welcome the
participation of a grievant's attorney at the earliest possible
stage of the grievance procedure and to seek the attorney's
assistance in the investigation of the facts, analysis of the con-
tract, research for helpful precedent, and even arbitrator
selection." 142
If the union objects, but the employer does not object to
participation by grievant's private counsel, a ruling by an arbi-
trator that the grievant's private counsel may participate in the
arbitration hearing may be viewed as an improper interference
with the "exclusive representative" status of the union under
the National Labor Relations Act. 143 Pursuant to this view the
following position has been taken by a union lawyer:
[T]he union should be permitted to serve as the exclusive
141. See sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1988).
Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3)
... of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).
Section 8(a)(l) provides in part: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 [section 7] of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (em-
phasis added). See also Jeltsch v. United Parcel Service, 128 L.R.R.M. 2502 (BNA)
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). InJeltsch, the court held that the union and the company were the
sole parties to the arbitration proceeding which upheld the discharge of the grievant,
and that New York law did not require the union to provide legal counsel for its
members who are at an arbitration hearing. Id. at 2507.
142. Webster, supra note 139, at 323. Under the general topic of "Whose Hearing
Is It Anyway?," at the Continuing Education Conference of the National Academy of
Arbitrators in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 28-30, 1988, Arbitrator Joseph F.
Gentile noted that, even where neither party objects to the presence of the grievant's
private attorney, he attempts to specify the role of the grievant's private attorney in
such a way as to prevent "a three-ring circus."
143. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1982).
Section 9(a) provides in pertinent part: "Representatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to ... conditions of employ-
ment .... Id. (emphasis added).
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representative to the exclusion of any other employee rep-
resentative, such as the grievant's private counsel, even if it
increases its exposure to potential litigation over the ade-
quacy of its representation. The arbitrator's judgment as to
the union's wisdom in exercising this [statutory] privilege is
irrelevant, except perhaps in his mediative role.
144
When both the union and the employer object to participa-
tion of grievant's private counsel in the arbitration hearing, the
union and the employer can still control the situation even if
the arbitrator rules that grievant's private counsel may partici-
pate in the hearing. This is illustrated by the following report
of a union lawyer:
A recent case comes to mind in which an arbitrator over-
ruled the joint objection of counsel for the union and the
employer to the participation of a grievant's "private coun-
sel" in a discharge hearing. Thereupon counsel for the
union and the employer requested a brief recess and, upon
their return, thanked the arbitrator for his efforts and re-
quested that he bill them for his services to that point. They
thereafter selected another arbitrator to hear the matter
who ordered the grievant's "private counsel" excluded
from the hearing.
14 5
Subsequent to the drafting of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes in
1974 and to the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Hines with its
reference to anticipation that "the contractual machinery
would operate within some minimum levels of integrity,"'
146
the clear trend of the law has been to deny the validity of an
employee's claim to representation by personal counsel, as
well as by the union, at an arbitration hearing. Although the
Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, several rulings of
lower courts have denied that an individual has such a right.
In Blake v. USM Corp. and UA W,14 7 the plaintiff, an individual
employee, sought an injunction to prevent the union and the
company from arbitrating her grievance without her being rep-
resented by counsel of her own choice. The nature of her
grievance is not identified in the case. Apparently, the UAW,
the union involved in the case, objected to the grievant's re-
144. Webster, supra note 139, at 322.
145. Id. at 322 n.4.
146. Hines, 424 U.S. at 571.
147. 94 L.R.R.M.(BNA) 2509 (D.N.H. 1977).
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quest to have private counsel represent her. The company
clearly objected to the request. Both the union and the com-
pany were defendants in the case. Grievant's petition was de-
nied by the Federal District Court of New Hampshire. 48
To support her request, the employee relied on the proviso
to section 9(a) of the N.L.R.A.14a and on Rule 20 of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association150 (AAA) since Step 4 of the griev-
ance procedure as set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement called for arbitration in accordance with the Volun-
tary Labor Arbitration Rules of the AAA. Rule 20 provided
(and still provides in the late 1980s): "Representation by
Counsel: Any party may be represented at the hearing by
counsel or by other authorized representative."' 5'
The federal district court in Blake quotes a decision of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which states: "We hold that...
the National Labor Relations Act [does not] require an em-
ployer to meet with any representative of an employee other
than the exclusive bargaining representative in order to settle
an employee grievance."15 2 In Malone,' 53 the case discussed in
Blake, an employee argued that he was entitled to have his own
attorney, instead of union representation, in proceedings in-
volving the termination of his employment. In response, the
court held that the employee does not have the right to compel
his employer to meet with him to adjust his grievance. Thus
the employee's attorney does not have such a right.15 4
The federal district court in Blake also stated that the em-
ployee misapprehended her rights under the collective bar-
gaining agreement and under the AAA Rules. The court noted
that, under the contract, arbitration could only be requested by
the union, and stated the following:
The law is clear that, if the employer objects to an em-
ployee being represented by an attorney of his or her
choice, such employee cannot be so represented. The em-
148. Id. at 2510.
149. Id. at 2509. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). See also Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. 50, 65
(1975) (section 9(a) interpreted by the United States Supreme Court).
150. VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION Asso-
CIATION Rule 20 (1987).
151. Id.
152. Blake, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2509 (quoting Malone v. United States Postal Service,
526 F.2d 1099, 1106 (6th Cir. 1975).
153. Malone v. United States Postal Service, 526 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1975).
154. Id. at 1107.
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ployer has the right to decide to deal only with the Union in
an arbitration proceeding. The parties to such proceeding
are the Union and the employer. An employee is not a
party to such an arbitration proceeding and, therefore, Rule
20 ... does not apply to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff has also complained that the Union had not
given her adequate representation. Until the arbitration
proceeding had been completed, such a complaint was obvi-
ously premature. ' 5
5
In the similar case of Laney v. Ford Motor Co. ,156 plaintiffs al-
leged that their employer and the UAW were conspiring to de-
prive them of their rights under the applicable collective
bargaining agreement. They argued that the court should
grant an injunction to restrain the company from conducting
further disciplinary proceedings against them unless plaintiffs
were represented by independently retained counsel. The
court, however, denied the injunction. It held that an em-
ployee is not entitled to independently retained counsel at a
disciplinary hearing or at a grievance proceeding because the
''union remains his exclusive [bargaining] representative
throughout the disciplinary and grievance hearings regardless of
whether it isfufiling its duty offair representation .... ,,t57 The court
stated that "[t]his result is dictated by Section 9(a) [of the
NLRA] and the terms of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement...." 158
In the relatively recent case of Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft
Co. , 59 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made the observa-
tion that "no court has adopted the rule that employees are
entitled to independently retained counsel in arbitration pro-
ceedings, or that the exclusion of such counsel from arbitra-
tion violates the duty of fair representation."' 160 In that case
grievant was discharged for alleged gambling on the com-
pany's premises. His defense was that he was only selling gold
jewelry to his fellow employees. The union appealed his griev-
155. Blake, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2509-10.
156. 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2002 (D. Minn. 1977).
157. Id. at 2005-06 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 2005.
159. Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1985).
160. Id. at 1483. Accord Valentin v. United States Postal Service, 787 F.2d. 748,
751 (lst Cir. 1986) (court refused to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that
Arbitrator Arnold Zack ruled that the grievant could not be represented by his per-
sonal attorney in arbitration).
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ance to arbitration, whereupon he asked the union to appoint
an attorney to represent him or to allow him to retain his own
counsel for the arbitration hearing. After the union denied
both requests, the Business Representative of the union repre-
sented the grievant at the arbitration hearing. Following the
issuance of the arbitration award which held that the employer
had just cause to discharge the grievant, the employee filed
suit in federal district court. He claimed that the union
breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to permit
him to have an attorney at the arbitration hearing. Among the
grievant's complaints were allegations that the union's Busi-
ness Representative spent only one and one-half hours in
preparation for the arbitration hearing, that he failed to con-
tact key witnesses and that his cross-examination of company
witnesses was inadequate. Nevertheless, holding that the
union had not breached its duty of fair representation, the
court found that there was nothing in the applicable collective
bargaining agreement which would entitle the grievant to
counsel at the arbitration hearing. The court noted in accord-
ance with the conclusion which it reached: "Decisions in other
circuits hold that it is for the union to decide the circum-
stances under which an attorney will be supplied to a
grievant."1 61
Thus, it must be concluded that claims that an arbitrator
should treat an individual as a full party to arbitration proceed-
ings and that the arbitrator should allow an individual to be
represented by an attorney of his own choosing have very little
support in the developing law despite some scholarly writings
and recommendations to the contrary. 162 A more common
161. Id.
162. See Summers, supra note 33, at 155. See also Hotel and Restaurant Employees
and Bartenders Int'l Union v. Michelson's Food Services, Inc., 545 F.2d 1248 (9th
Cir. 1976). Michelson's Food Services involved a complex and confusing set of proce-
dural questions. In that case the grievant appeared at the arbitration hearing with his
private counsel, who accused the union of conspiring with the employer to deny the
grievant and others compensation due them. This counsel suggested that the union
be joined as a defendant with the employer in the arbitration proceeding, and that
the arbitrator be empowered to award compensatory and punitive damages to the
grievant. The union then stated that it was willing to have the grievant and the griev-
ant's private counsel handle the grievant's case in arbitration. Other procedural
problems included grievant's refusal to agree to be bound by the arbitrator's deci-
sion. In an interim arbitration award consisting of five parts, Arbitrator Ted Jones
ruled, in part, that the grievant would be designated as a "party" to the arbitration
proceeding. This part of the interim award was held by the Ninth Circuit to be within
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view is summarized in the following excerpt from an opinion of
Betty Murphy, former chairman of the NLRB: "Even where the
union proceeds to arbitration on an employee's grievance, the
aggrieved employee is but an outsider-a third party-to such
proceeding, having no standing to participate as a party, to
have counsel different from union counsel, to examine wit-
nesses, or to submit evidence."'
163
VII. CLAIM THAT AN ARBITRATION HEARING Is NOT A
PRIVATE PROCEEDING AND THAT INDIVIDUAL
GRIEVANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE
"OUTSIDERS" PRESENT
Is a labor arbitration hearing a private proceeding between
the union and the employer, thus permitting the parties to in-
sist on privacy and confidentiality? Professor Clyde Summers
says that the answer is "no." He takes the view that other per-
sons have a right to be present at the hearing because of obli-
gations the arbitrator owes to individual employees to make
sure that the individual's rights are fully heard and fully adjudi-
cated.164 He is not impressed with the argument that the dis-
pute is only between the union and the employer. Nor is he
persuaded by the argument that the grievant is not a party to
the collective bargaining agreement which contains the arbitra-
tion provisions, and thus is not permitted to bring outsiders
into the hearing. Nevertheless, his views are contrary to those
of most arbitrators. There is no Supreme Court decision on
point to answer the question as to whose views should prevail.
Should the grievant have the right to have his friends who
may be local politicians, leaders of community organizations
for minority groups, etc. attend the arbitration hearing? Many
the power of the arbitrator in these unusual circumstances. The court also observed
that, as a party, the grievant could participate in person and by counsel at the arbitra-
tion hearing, and that the arbitration award would bind the grievant even if he re-
fused to participate in the arbitration hearing (in the absence of fraud or a breach of
the union's duty of fair representation). Id. at 1254-55. However, the value of a
ruling by an arbitrator that the grievant is a "party" to the arbitration proceeding has
been questioned, and the use of this technique, even in this case, has been criticized.
See Webster, supra note 139, at 323. It is also interesting to note that, in the more
recent decision in Castelli, the Ninth Circuit does not even mention the Michelson case.
Castelli, 752 F.2d 1480.
163. General American Transp. Corp., 228 NLRB at 813 (Murphy, Chairman,
concurring).
164. Summers, supra note 33, at 148.
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arbitrators believe that the parties (the union and the em-
ployer) are entitled to privacy, and that they have the right to
exclude "outsiders" from an arbitration hearing because pri-
vacy and confidentiality are among the advantages claimed for
arbitration over a proceeding in court. 165 Thus, arbitrators
have excluded friends of a grievant, leaders of such organiza-
tions as the NAACP, even the wife of the grievant (in a case
where the wife was the president of a union other than the
union involved in arbitration) and newspaper reporters from
arbitration proceedings where one or both of the parties ob-
jected to their presence. There is also a strong institutional
sense in the American Arbitration Association that privacy is
one of the desirable features of labor arbitration.
Such a view is supported by the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes.
Section 2C of this Code, which is entitled "Privacy of Arbitra-
tion," ' 66 provides in relevant part that:
1. All significant aspects of an arbitration proceeding
must be treated by the arbitrator as confidential unless this
requirement is waived by both parties or disclosure is re-
quired or permitted by law.t 67a. Attendance at hearings by
persons not representing the parties or invited by either or both of
them should be permitted only when the parties agree or when an
applicable law requires or permits [such attendance]. ... 168
e. Applicable laws, regulations or practices of the par-
ties may permit or even require exceptions to the above
noted principles of privacy. 1
69
165. See CODE §§ 39, 40 & 47.
166. CODE §§ 39-47.
167. CODE § 39.
168. CODE § 40 (emphasis added).
169. CODE § 47. In accordance with the views provided in the Code is the follow-
ing statement from SACKS AND KURLANTZICK, supra note 35: "Arbitration provides a
private resolution of the labor-management dispute, free from media coverage or
public attendance." Id. at n.37. On the other hand, Rule 22 of the American Arbitra-
tion Association, which gives the arbitrator more discretion than the privacy section
of the Code, provides that:
Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration are entitled to attend hear-
ings. The arbitrator shall have the power to require the retirement of any
witness ... during the testimony of other witnesses. It shall be discretionary
with the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the attendance of any other
person.
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
Rule 22 (1987). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 242-43
(1985) (broad remedial authority exists in the arbitrator).
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In light of these provisions of the Code, how should Arbitra-
tor Ted Jones have ruled on the admission of "outsiders" to
the arbitration hearing in the following case, reported in a
book on "Arbitration Practice"? 170 The case involved a claim
of racial discrimination, and Arbitrator Jones had to apply a
collective bargaining agreement to the claim in light of a con-
sent decree. Just after the parties were seated in a large hear-
ing room, about nine persons, who were leaders of the black
community, walked into the room. These persons had worked
in support of the consent decree, and wanted to observe the
arbitration hearing. One of the persons was a state senator,
several persons were members of the state Fair Employment
Practice Committee and several others were lawyers. The
union representatives became very upset about the appearance
of these "outsiders." Stating that they "would not stay with
the 'outsiders' present,"' 7' the union representatives walked
out. Although the union representatives continued to be upset
at the presence of the "outsiders," Arbitrator Jones ruled that
the "outsiders" could remain in the room. Arbitrator Jones
does not disclose whether the union representatives returned
to the hearing room, but he does say that he felt the outsiders
"had to be there in that case."' 172 The Arbitrator stressed the
fact that the outsiders had come to "support the grievant, and
he wanted them present."'173
It seems clear that the outsiders were not representatives of
the union or the employer, and that they were not invited to
the arbitration hearing by the union or the employer.
Although Arbitrator Jones refers to the problem and states
that he "tried to work it oUt,"' 17 4 he does not report any agree-
ment by the parties that the outsiders could attend the hearing.
Nor does he report any law, regulation or practice of the par-
ties which would require or permit the attendance of the out-
siders at the hearing.
If the union did not agree to their attendance and remained
out of the hearing room due to the ruling of the arbitrator that
170. Jones, Selected Problems of Procedure and Evidence, ARBITRATION IN PRAcTiCE 51
(A. Zack ed 1984) (Ted Jones is a professor of law at UCLA, and is a prominent
leader of the National Academy of Arbitrators).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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the outsiders could attend the hearing and if the arbitrator
held for the employer on the racial discrimination claim on the
basis of the ex parte presentation of the employer, one may
wonder whether a court would vacate the award on the ground
that the arbitrator had failed to give the union a fair hearing in
light of the privacy provisions of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. 75 It should be noted that the Code does not state
that outsiders may be present if the grievant invited them or
that community leaders are entitled to attend a labor arbitra-
tion hearing if they wish to support the grievant. Additional
questions, to which there are no answers, are also suggested by
this problem. One such question is whether a court would
hold that the refusal of a union to represent a grievant at an
arbitration hearing after the arbitrator, rightly or wrongfully,
had ruled against the union on attendance of outsiders, consti-
tuted a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. An-
other question is whether an arbitrator's ruling permitting
attendance of outsiders against the wishes of a company
(where the union has not invited the outsiders to attend the
hearing) should be deemed to be a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility 76 and a violation of due process so
that the arbitration award, if against the company, should be
vacated for lack of due process.
A claim that is related to individual rights, but is different
from a claim that a grievant's supporters are entitled to be
present at the arbitration hearing, is a claim by an individual
employee who is in a different bargaining unit at the same
company that he should be allowed to attend the arbitration
hearing. Should it make any difference if the employee who is
not a member of the bargaining unit involved in arbitration is a
grievance committee representative of another bargaining
unit? Should it make a difference if employees who are griev-
ance committee representatives of several unions representing
several other bargaining units at the same company show a le-
gitimate interest in the arbitration hearing?
An illustration of this problem arose in one case before this
author in a western mining state when counsel for two unions
that were involved in arbitration with an employer requested a
ruling that all representatives of other unions, who were em-
175. CODE §§ 39-47.
176. Id. at § 40.
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ployees of the same company, and who were, in fact, sitting in
the back of the hearing room, must leave the room. These
other unions were not parties to the cases before me, but they
had an interest in the cases pending before me because all of
these unions (those which were parties and those which were
not) had formed a loose coordinating committee while dealing
with the company over a job classification program. The rea-
son why the two unions wanted to have the representatives of
the other unions excluded from the hearing room was that
these unions had refused to pay for part of the heavy costs of
having me travel from the East to the West to spend about a
week in conducting hearings on complex job classification
cases in the mining industry. The employer took a neutral po-
sition on the issue of the presence of these other representa-
tives on company property where the hearing was being held
because the company had to deal with these unions.
Since the two unions who were parties stated that they were
willing to have a representative of any "outsider" union stay if
that union would agree to pay part of the costs, I asked each
person in the back of the room to stand, give his name and the
name of his union, and state whether that union would join in
the cases and pay part of the costs. Each "outsider" union rep-
resentative complied with my request and stated that his union
would not pay any of the costs of the proceeding. One large
miner, a representative of the Machinists' Union whom I knew
from prior cases, said: "Hey, Doc, what do you plan to do if
you order us to leave and we don't leave?" I responded that "I
assumed that some day a procedural question might arise
where I would want to call a recess to think about it, and it
seemed that such a time had arrived."
I then ruled that the arbitration proceeding was a private
proceeding, that the parties were entitled to privacy, that the
representatives of the "outsider" unions were not entitled to
be present, that they should leave, and that I was calling a re-
cess. Several of the "outsider" union representatives left im-
mediately, and in a few minutes several more grumbled about
not staying where they were not wanted and left. The parties
(the two unions and the employer) agreed that I should not
make any attempt to start the hearing until all of the "outsid-
ers" had left.
After about forty-five minutes, only "Joe," the Machinists'
representative, remained. I asked the two unions that were
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parties whether they would object if Joe sat in the hallway by
the hearing room doorway which had no door and which was
close to the location where the witnesses, the court reporter
and I sat in the hearing room. The unions that were parties
accepted this idea because the principle that Joe could not be
in the hearing room would be maintained. I told Joe that I
could offer him a better seat than he had in the back of the
room, and that he would be able to hear better if he sat in the
hallway near the location where the witnesses testified. He ac-
cepted the idea, and he sat there for several days during the
hearings.
Two observations are in order concerning this illustration.
The first is that this example is illustrative of a practice of many
arbitrators to try to accommodate the desires of those who are
present in the hearing room. The second is that this example
is illustrative of the practice of most arbitrators to observe and
comply with the "privacy" provisions of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes.
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